ABSTRACT Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are progressive ad hoc networks that comprise of distributed sensors that are typically and randomly deployed over the target region. The valuable information from the sensor nodes is allowed to access with the help of gateway node by the registered user. To ensure secure communication, a session key is exchanged between the participants over the insecure channel. In this paper, we identified some deficiencies in Jung et al.'s scheme and then devised an enhanced biometricbased anonymous user authentication and the key agreement scheme that is also embedded with symmetric cryptosystem for WSNs. The advantage of using biometric login is to ensure the legal user's efficient login. We conferred about preserving the security of our proposed scheme, we primarily applied formal verification BAN-logic method to check the exactness of mutual authentication. Furthermore, used automated validation of internet security protocols and applications software that is widely accepted and its results confirm that our scheme is secure against active and passive attacks, including forgery, replay, and man-in-the-middle attack. In addition, an informal analysis proves our scheme can withstand various possible attacks on authentication protocols over the insecure channel. Furthermore, our scheme is more appropriate for WSNs based upon the comparison of computational efficiency and security requirements with recent results.
I. INTRODUCTION
These days witness a tremendous development in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). They are used in various fields for different purposes due to their advancements in hardware technology and software skills. The unattended environment where the sensor nodes are deployed along with the unreliable wireless communication offered in WSNs and the peculiar characteristics owned by WSNs pertains security relevant issues to many applications of WSNs. It is essential to ensure security services for the applications of WSNs to achieve all the benefits faultlessly. In general, WSNs consisting of users, gateways, and sensors which is the generally spreading progression, where the users are doubtlessly permitted to get to the hoped sensor's to acquire the information and further they are allowed to access the nodes as shown in the Fig. 1 . Further, when sensor networks are used for applications such as monitoring and continuous tracking in surveillance, it is necessary to report event information securely and accurately in a timely manner to the respective authorities. When WSNs are used for these applications sensor nodes frequently suffer from different types of attacks such as eavesdropping, intercepting, data manipulating, replay attack, impersonation attack, and attacks denying the event reports from reaching the Gateway nodes (GWN). Hence it is necessary to design secure communication schemes to get rid of these attacks or to mitigate the impact of these attack on WSNs applications. Although WSNs perform important functions in numerous application fields, the drawbacks of the network are evident. First, WSNs are often deployed in unattended environments [1] , [2] or enemy-controlled environments. Therefore, the networks are effortlessly controlled. Second, given their characteristics, WSNs consist of numerous resource-constrained nodes. The fundamental impediment focuses are as per the following [3] :
1. The transmission of WSNs is unreliable due to their deployment in the harsh environment, short transmission range, and the low data-transfer rate with high energy cost consumptions. 2. The modern-day sensor nodes are embedded with a small battery power due to their small size. Due to the deployment of WSNs in a hostile environment; thus, energy appurtenance is impracticable. 3. The computation cost and storage capacity is limited due to the technicality of sensor nodes. Making the information accessible to the users who sits in remote locations, and request for completed the framework must ensure the mutual approval prior empowering the users to get to the real-time information. The low-entropy humanmemorable passwords are often cased the security weakness in the two-factor authentication protocols as they are selected from the small pool of dictionary and sometimes stored in smartcards or the servers. These low-entropy passwords can be obtained in polynomial time, which gives an advantage to the attacker in guessing the user's passwords. This shows, reliability and preservation of high sensitive information which deals with security, the two-factor based methods are proven inefficient. Thus, three-factor authentication system is merely suggested in designing the authentication and key agreement for the remote user authentication. Furthermore, these three-factor methods efficiently tackle the password guessing attack [4] , [38] , [39] .
Based on the design methodology discussed by [5] and [6] and considering the security features and attributes into account as discussed by [7] , we understand there is a serious need of utilizing the three-factor adoptability. Interested readers can go through the detailed case study on biometrics modality discussed by [8] , where they have discussed the various biometric extraction error comparisons of false match rate and false non-match rate.
The benefits of adapting three-factor facility are arranged as follows:
1) Biometric keys cannot be forgotten or lost.
2) Guessing of biometric information is infeasible.
3) Transmitting the biometric keys either by copying or sharing is very difficult. 4) Forgery of biometric keys is extremely hard.
There are many advantages and disadvantages in considering/using the WSN. They are listed as follows: Advantages:
• Network setups can be carried out without fixed infrastructure.
• Suitable for the non-reachable places such as over the sea, mountains, rural areas or deep forests.
• Flexible if there is random situation when additional workstation is needed.
• Implementation pricing is cheap.
• It avoids plenty of wiring.
• It might accommodate new devices at any time.
• It's flexible to undergo physical partitions.
• It can be accessed by using a centralized monitor. Disadvantages:
• Less secure because hackers can enter the access point and obtain all the information.
• Lower speed as compared to a wired network.
• More complicated to configure compared to a wired network.
• Easily troubled by surroundings (walls, microwave, large distances due to signal attenuation, etc).
• It is easy for hackers to hack it we couldn't control propagation of waves.
• Comparatively low speed of communication.
• Gets distracted by various elements like Blue-tooth.
• Still Costly (most importantly)
A. RELATED WORKS
In 2011, [9] proposed an ECC-based two-factor authentication scheme which seems to be well equip design. But, due to the design flaw such as the erroneous presentation of mutual authentication between the user and sensor, their scheme is proven insecure. To enhance and correct Yeh et al.'s scheme, [10] demonstrated an improved version of [9] 's scheme which aims to resist more security attributes and performs with minimal cost computational and communicational overhead. Furthermore, In 2014, [11] analyzed [10] scheme and proven [10] 's scheme faulty due to the stolen/lost smartcard attack, key-share attack, and exhaustive sensor energy attack. As a part of correcting scheme, Shi and Gong [10] presented enhanced authentication protocol. In the same year, [12] exhibited with a public key version using ECC was proposed in order to efficiently tackle untraceability and perfect forward secrecy. Moreover, [13] , [14] , [15] shown that [16] proposal is faulty and couldn't handle the security features effectively such as user anonymity, insider attack, session key agreement, mutual authentication, and also password guessing attack. [17] demonstrated [11] , [18] schemes which were meant to handle the security features efficiently but they were also proven faulty such as user anonymity attack, offline guessing attack, de-synchronization, lack of strong forward security, and forgery attack. As a remedy, Wu et al. comeup with a proposal with formal verification proof to enhance the security for wireless sensor networks.
In a recent advancement, [19] proposed a scheme for WSN with the symmetric cryptosystem. To strengthen their proposal, they claimed that their scheme has the potential to withstand the different variants of attacks. Furthermore, after studying and done an analysis of [19] scheme, [20] shown the faults in Chen et al.'s design which fails to resist smart card loss attack, and denial of service attack, due to their inefficient verification method. In addition, Chen et al.'s scheme fails to provide user anonymity as the identity of the user is transmitted in a plaintext form during login request. Moreover, due to the delay in detecting the incorrect login credentials such as password, Chen et al.'s scheme wastes the resources of the user and also sensor nodes in both communication and computational overheads costs.
B. MOTIVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTION
Reference [20] chooses to improve [19] 's design in which an anonymous user tries to authentication with the credentials provided by the gateway node and then the sensor node computes a valid session key which is agreed to be used in further communications among the communicated parties. They have finely presented their proposal and to strengthen their proposal they claimed that their scheme could withstand the security requirements such as smart card loss attacks [21] , password guessing attacks [6] , user impersonation attacks [7] , replay attacks [22] , privileged-insider attacks [30] , etc. They also claimed that their scheme was highly efficient and very suited to WSN environments.
Firstly, after a thorough study of [20] , during our examination it is observed that their proposal is still faulty and failed to handle password guessing attack, forgery attack, user traceability attack. Moreover, the privacy of the session key is not considered in their scheme, as a consequence, an active insider can extract the session key and impose false computations. Furthermore, due to the dynamic nature of the WSNs, their scheme fails to support node addition facility.
Second, as a remedy, we present an efficient user authentication and key agreement scheme with the capabilities of resisting the password guessing attack and forgery attack. The correctness of our scheme is presented using BAN-logic to ensure the restriction of mutual authentication, and replay attack. With the adoptability of AVISPA, which is a suitable formal security method to prove our scheme resists all the security attributes. To strengthen our discussion, with the help of informal security analysis, we proved our scheme handles the security features well and ensures the security. Furthermore, the detailed discussion on computational performance and security analysis of proposed scheme is given.
C. PAPER OUTLINE
A brief mathematical preliminaries are discussed in Section II. In Section III, we discussed Jung et al.'s scheme. In Section IV, we discussed the shortcomings of Jung et al.'s scheme. In Section V, we suggested the necessary counter measures to restrict the attacks in Jung et al.'s scheme. In Section VI, a new user authentication scheme is discussed.
In Section VII, a formal analysis BAN-logic proof to demonstrate the mutual authentication, AVISPA tool to check the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks, and informal security analysis are presented. Section VIII gives a comparative analysis of the proposed scheme with other schemes. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section IX.
II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES A. BIOMETRICS AND FUZZY EXTRACTOR
Biometric verification allows one to confirm or establish an individual's identity. As statistical information regarding biometric input is unpredictable, designing cryptographic solutions for securing each scenario is tedious. Converting biometric data to uniform reproducible random strings that can for example, be used as a secret key is therefore necessary. Fuzzy extractors are a pair of functions where one function generates the uniform random bits from given input while the other recovers the string from an input close to the original input within a predefined threshold. Mathematically, the function pair in a fuzzy extractor is as follows: Gen: is probabilistic generation function accepts the input Bio which is the personal biometrics information of the user, and in return it gives σ ∈ {0, 1} l as the biometric key with the bit length l. Rep: is a deterministic function which accepts the input in the form of the user biometrics, say Bio and τ as the public reproduction parameter, considering the Hamming distance (Bio ,Bio) < t, where t is an error tolerance threshold value. The output is the original biometric key σ = Rep(Bio , τ ). Using the fuzzy extractor technique, local biometric verification is performed in our scheme.
B. NOTATIONS AND RULES OF BAN-LOGIC
To verify the correctness of our AKA protocol we employ BAN-logic [24] . Here, all the participating parties during their communication undergo the verification of the transmitted messages: a legitimate user U i and an opted sensor node SN j agree upon a fresh shared session key. This happens when the scheme is executed and the legitimacy of the participants is verified. The notations of the BAN-logic are presented in Table 1 .
We present the rules of BAN-logic as shown in Table 2 , in order to present the logical posits in the formal terms [6] , [24] :
This section deals with the necessary characteristics and assumptions, including the attacker's capabilities in WSNs environment.
(1) As the entire communication takes place on insecure channel, an attacker possess the capability to intercept or modify any messages that are transmitted among the parties over public channel [6] , [11] . (2) The transmitted messages can be eavesdropped by an attacker [25] , [26] . (3) By applying the power consumption analysis on the captured smartcards, an attacker can extract the valuable information stored on the smartcard [27] , [41] . (4) Though the gateway nodes is secure, an attacker has the potential to capture the sensor node physically, due to the hostile environments [30] . (5) The low-entropy passwords and identities can be guessed in an off-line manner by an attacker [22] , [40] , [57] . stored into smart card memory and transmit it to the user over the secure channel . Reg3: U i stores b to the smart card's memory.
B. LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PHASES
The registered user U i wishes to get some services from the sensor nodes. But, before that the validity of the user's credentials are verified on the basis of smartcard parameters and user's login credentials. The details of this phase is as follows:
L1 : U i inputs his login credentials identity ID i and password PW i into the smartcard reader. Then computes the masked
= M i * this hold with the stored value of smart card. Otherwise, terminates the process. L3 : The smart card generates a random nonce R 1 and
GWN verifies DID i , T 1 with the received values. If succeed, GWN acknowledge the legitimacy of U i and proceed with the next step. Otherwise, the process is terminated. A2 : GWN selects a random nonce R 2 and computes
, and
. Then, transmits the message
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If this unsuccessful, S n terminates the process. Else, believes GWN is authentic. 
C. PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
This phase takes action whenever U i wishes to changes his/her old password to new password. This phase involves no assistance with GWN and S n . The details are as follows: P1 : U i inserts his/her smartcard into the card reading device and inputs his personal login credentials A. PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK Let us suppose that, the attacker A has registered as a legal user to the system. Now A also own's his own login credentials and other parameters to login into the system also makes use of the captured communication messages of U i . The attack is performed as follows:
PG1: Attacker own's user's smartcard and gets the infor- = DID * i . If the verification is successful, the attacker A is successful in breaking the scheme. Then A proceeds with the next step to forge the user U i . Otherwise, repeat the steps FA1 − FA3 until attacker is successful in breaking the scheme without the interference of the GWN . FA4: Now, A modifies user's current message 
E. FAILS TO SUPPORT DYNAMIC NODE ADDITION
Basically, in WSNs, the sensor nodes are deployed in an hostile environment and are often captured physically [30] . Thus, the data of the captured sensor nodes contain the useful information. Sometimes, due to heavy computation burden sensor nodes fails to respond. In such cases, there should be a provision to add or delete sensor node according to the need of the system. It is evident that Jung et al.'s scheme fails to provide this essential feature.
F. NO PROVISION OF VERIFYING THE SCHEME TO ENSURE FORMAL SECURITY [31] To evaluate and verify the efficiency of the proposed scheme there is a strictly necessary of formal security analysis. It is observed that, Jung et al.'s scheme just presented the informal security analysis and neglected the formal security verification for their scheme security. The security pitfalls were highlighted in the Table 4 , protected by the existing schemes. It is observed that many schemes in Table 4 fails to resist many important features for example; password guessing attack, user anonymity, impersonation attack. Moreover, the dynamic node addition feature is not considered in many of the cited schemes. Moreover, as mentioned in Note.2, the masked master secret keys under the hash function couldn't ensure the user as unique. This shows that, any attacker can become a registered user and furthermore, instead of the legitimate user, A can anonymously login to the system. Thus there is a strict need to focus on differentiating the legitimate users from the attackers. Looking into the drawbacks of Jung et al.'s design, we focus on restricting such anonymous authentication. In Jung et al.'s scheme, in the section IV-B, it is observed that every registered user gets the same parametric value v = h(x r ), which remains same in every session and every registered user can make use of it. This opens the doors for the intruders/attackers to gain access to the valuable information which the legitimate user trying to access. Instead of making use of v = h(x r ) and give it to the users during registration by masking it as v = h(x r ID i ), where the improved parameter ensure the uniqueness of the user and also restrict attackers in imposing forgery attack on behalf of the legitimate user. This correction ensures each user is obtaining the unique secret value according to their registration. This countermeasure takes care of the dishonest user by producing honest user's identity to enjoy the services.
VI. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In our scheme, the user makes use of his biometric feature to login in the system and establishes a secure connection with the sensor node via gateway node. The biometric fuzzy extractor is considered to extract the biometric key of the user to tackle with the password guessing attacks. The detailed description is discussed in four phases: user registration, login and authentication, biometric/password update, and node addition. The illustration of this phase is found in Fig. 2 .
B. LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PHASES
The login phase is executed to validate the user credentials and restrict denial of service attack against attacker when U i wants to gain access to WSN. The details are given below. The illustration of this phase is found in Fig. 3 . L1 : The user U i inserts his smart card into the card reader. U i inputs his login credentials such as identity ID i , password PW i and biometric feature by applying fuzzy extractor's reproduction function
= M * i with the stored value of smart card. If this verification holds, the smart card acknowledges the legitimacy of the user and proceeds to the next step. Otherwise, terminates the process. L3 : The smart card generates a random nonce R 1 and computes . Therefore, the smartcard finally contains
The illustration of this phase is given in Fig. 4 .
D. DYNAMIC SENSOR NODE ADDITION PHASE
Some sensor nodes may lapse due to their battery utilization or they can be physically caught by an attacker. A provision for deployment of newly arrival sensor node S new n be deployed in the current WSN . into the sensor node's memory before deploying S new n into the network.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security of the proposed scheme is demonstrated using the BAN-logic proof which ensures the mutual authentication among the participants. Furthermore, using AVISPA tool, we demonstrated the security of the proposed scheme against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. Moreover, to ensure the other security requirements and functionalities we performed an informal security analysis. The details are as follows:
A. BAN-LOGIC PROOF TO DEMONSTRATE THE MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
This method of formal security analysis is recommended to demonstrate the mutual authentication and session key etablishment between U i and SN j using the widely-accepted BAN-logic [32] and the details of notation and rules can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2 .
Goals:
To prove the method demonstrated successful, few goals need to be set and the design must satisy the analytic procedures of the BAN-logic [24] . The test goals can be formulated as follows:
Idealized form: •
Considering the BAN-logic rules as presented in Table 2 and taking the assumptions(see Table 5 ) into account, the analysis is carried out to prove the mutual authentication among the communicated parties as follows:
From the message 1, we can see:
From the step S-1 and assumption A 11 , we take the message meaning rule to derive:
From the step S-2 and taking A 1 , the freshness conjuncatenation rule is applied to get:
Using the steps S-2 and S-3, the nonce-verification rule is applied to derive:
Considering S-4, the belief rule is applied to obtain: S-5:
Taking the step S-5 and A 15 into consideration, jurisdiction rule is applied to get: S-6: S n |≡ (U i ID i ←→ S n ). From the message 2, we can write:
From the step S-7 and assumption A 11 , we take the message meaning rule to derive:
From step S-8 and assumption A 1 , A 6 , the freshness conjuncatenation rule is applied to get: S-9:
Using the steps S-8 and S-9, the nonce-verification rule is applied to derive: S-10:
Considering S-10, the belief rule is applied to obtain: S-11:
Taking the step S-11 and A 16 , into consideration, jurisdiction rule is applied to get: S-12:
From the message 3, we can infer: S-13:
From the step S-13 and assumption A 12 , we take the message meaning rule to derive: S-14:
From S-14 and assumption A 2 , the freshness conjuncatenation rule is applied to get: S-15:
Using the steps S-14 and S-15, the nonce-verification rule is applied to derive:
Considering S-16, the belief rule is applied to obtain: S-17: S n |≡ GWN |≡ (GWN SID n ←→ S n ). Taking the step S-17 and A 17 , into consideration, jurisdiction rule is applied to get: S-18: S n |≡ (GWN SID n ←→ S n ). From the message 4, we could derive:
From S-19 and A 12 , we take the message meaning rule to derive: S-20:
From S-20 and assumption A 2 , A 7 , the freshness conjuncatenation rule is applied to get: S-21:
Using the steps S-20 and S-21, the nonce-verification rule is applied to derive:
Considering S-22, the belief rule is applied to obtain: S-23: S n |≡ GWN |≡ (GWN R 2 ←→ S n ). Taking the step S-23 and A 18 , into consideration, jurisdiction rule is applied to get: S-24: S n |≡ (GWN
From the message 5, we could derive: S-25:
From S-25 and A 14 , we take the message meaning rule to derive:
From S-26 and assumption A 3 , the freshness conjuncatenation rule is applied to get:
Using the steps S-26 and S-27, the nonce-verification rule is applied to derive:
Considering S-28, the belief rule is applied to obtain:
Taking the step S-29 and A 19 , into consideration, jurisdiction rule is applied to get:
From the message 6, we could derive:
From S-31 and assumption A 13 , we take the message meaning rule to derive:
From S-32 and assumption A 3 , A 8 , the freshness conjuncatenation rule is applied to get:
Using the steps S-32 and S-33, the nonce-verification rule is applied to derive:
Considering S-17, S-18, S-29 and S-34, the belief rule is applied to obtain:
(Goal 4) Taking the step S-35 and A 21 , into consideration, jurisdiction rule is applied to get:
(Goal 3) From the message 7, we could derive: S-37:
From S-37 and assumption A 10 , we take the message meaning rule to derive: S-38:
From S-38 and assumption A 4 , A 9 , the freshness conjuncatenation rule is applied to get: S-39:
Using the steps S-38 and S-39, the nonce-verification rule is applied to derive: S-40:
Considering the steps S-5, S-6, and S-39, the belief rule is applied to obtain: S-41:
Taking the step S-41 and A 20 , into consideration, jurisdiction rule is applied to get: S-42:
From the message 8, we could derive:
From S-43 and assumption A 10 , we take the message meaning rule to derive:
From S-44 and assumption A 5 , A 9 , the freshness conjuncatenation rule is applied to get:
Using the steps S-44 and S-45, the nonce-verification rule is applied to derive:
Considering the steps S-5, S-6, S-41 and S-46, the belief rule is applied to obtain: S-47:
(Goal 2) Taking the step S-47 and A 22 , into consideration, jurisdiction rule is applied to get: S-48:
(Goal 1) In view of the Steps 35, 36, 47, and 48, the proposed scheme provides the mutual authentication and key agreement by achieves all the goals (Goals 1-4) . 
B. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING AVISPA SIMULATION TOOL
Inspite of the examination regarding the formal security, we give the reenactment results using the [33] tool to our proposed scheme. In recent years, the formal security verification using the AVISPA tool becomes one of the powerful analysis to check the security of a scheme. This AVISPA tool [33] uses the High Level Protocol Specification Language(HLPSL) for implementing the security protocol, which is a role-oriented language. The HLPSL2IF translator makes the HLPSL code into the intermediate form (IF) which is given as input to one of the comprises one of the four variant backends (Fig. 5): (i) On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC) (ii) CL-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe) VOLUME 6, 2018
(iii) AT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) (iv) Tree-Automata-based Protocol-Analyzer (TA4SP) In these backends, an implementation is done in which a variety of state-of-art-automatic analysis techniques are carried out. HLPSL consists of basic roles which are executed according to the network for the entities involved. In addition, the session roles are considered as a mandatory role to enhance the concrete arguments which indulge to all the basic roles for the involved entities. Furthermore, the toplevel role is considered as the environment which is again another mandatory role which can be compared and included for one or more sessions involving the global constants. In HLPSL, the intruder (always denoted by i) takes some roles as legitimate users; hence, it also participates in the execution of protocol as a concrete session. The Dolev-Yao threat model [23] is implemented so that the replay and manin-the-middle attacks can be verified against the attacker. The AVISPA and HLPSL specifications can be found in detail in [34] . Various roles including the basic roles for user U i (see Fig. 6 ), GWN (see Fig. 7 ) and SN j (see Fig. 8 ), and the mandatory roles for the session, goal and environment (see Fig. 9 ) are implemented in HLPSL for the proposed scheme.
The implementation of our scheme is done on the basis of HLPSL [34] used in AVISPA. The more detailed information regarding AVISPA architecture and HLPSL are available [33] . The proposed scheme is simulated with the help of the Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA (SPAN) [50] , [51] , and using the widely-accepted OFMC and CL-AtSe backends. At present, both SATMC and TA4SP back-ends do not support bitwise XOR operation. Thus, the simulation results of the proposed scheme under these SATMC and TA4SP back-ends are reported as inconclusive. Therefore, we omitted the simulation results for these backends in this paper. Fig. 10 represents the results under OFMC gives out to be 9327 nodes are visited with the search time is 54.43 seconds, and the depth is 6 plies. From the result, it is clear that our scheme demonstrates safe and secure. The simulation results provided in Fig. 10 assure that the proposed scheme satisfies the design properties, and is secure against both replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
C. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
Here, this section deals with rigorous analysis where we demonstrate our scheme is capable of handling the following attacks. [47] In the registration phase, as a part of registration the user
1) PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
. So, the privileged insider at GWN does not come to know the password of the user applying for registration, he cannot obtain PW i from PW i due to the colliion resistant one-way property of the hash function, and he cannot guess PW i from PW i without knowing the random strings b, α i . Hence, our scheme resists the privileged insider attack.
2) USER ANONYMITY [46] , [47] Considering the threat model into account, we suppose A captures the communicated messages from U i , GWN , and S n , respectively. The messages 4 } consist of user's identity information, which is masked using the hash function as DID i = h(ID i ||R 1 ). Thus, without the knowledge of R 1 and biometric value α i (which only the legitimate user can know/compute), it is computationally infeasible for any A to derive the valid user's identity ID i . As a result, our scheme holds the user anonymity property.
3) BIOMETRIC/PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK [40] , [48] , [52] We have made use of biometric fuzzy extractor to get α i value and make use of it in the computation of
. This shows that A cannot gain any advantage, as guessing and computation of α i and PW i in M i is like solving the inverting hash function values. Thus, it is computationally infeasible for an A to guess the user's credentials. Thus, our scheme is free from the password guessing and biometric key guessing attack. [44] , [45] From the practical point-of-view an active attacker can traps the login message Message 1 = < DID i , Reg i , A i , T 1 > of U i during the execution of the protocol, where
4) USER IMPERSONATE ATTACK
. A may tries to extract or produce some valid message/information in order to make GWN believe A as authentic. In order to do so, A needs to compute valid message Message 1 . As A cannot compute < DID i , Reg i , A i >, without the knowledge of < ID i , α i , b, R 1 > and secret parameters < v, k >. This results in computationally infeasible for A to forge/guess the trapped message in a polynomial time. Thus, our scheme resists user impersonation attack. [20] , [53] Suppose that the attacker obtains all transmitted message such as {DID i , Reg i , A i , T 1 } and {MM i , DID i , B i , T 2 } and tries to impersonate as a legal gateway node. However, It is not feasible to decrypt the A i = E k (DID i , R 1 , T 1 ) without the symmetry key k. Therefore, the attacker cannot impersonate as a valid gateway node. VOLUME 6, 2018 6) RESIST THE NODE CAPTURE ATTACK [42] , [43] , [49] Suppose that the attacker captures the sensor node. Every sensor S j has its own identity SID n and secret number x s . There is no relation among the identities and secret numbers of the sensors. So even if some sensors are captured by A, it is hard for A to pretend to be other sensors. [20] , [48] , [54] Let us assume, an attacker captures user's smart card, and apply the power analysis and extract the stored information from it. To deliver denial of service attack, attacker tries to modify the password. But, the attacker fails to update/ modify the user's password as a secure verification steps are performed during password change phase. If the attacker needs to login using user's credentials, the attacker has to guess/know both user ID i and PW i . Therefore, our proposed scheme is secure for denial of service attack.
5) GATEWAY NODE IMPERSONATION ATTACK

7) DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS
8) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND SESSION KEY
AGREEMENT [40] , [41] , [55] We divide this property into three cases: [52] , [56] We suppose that, attacker A captures the transmitted mes-
and {D i , T 4 } and tries to compute the session key SK = h(h(ID i R 1 ) h(x s SID n ) R 2 T 2 ). Here A needs to possess the required parameters such as ID i , R 1 , R 2 , x s , SID n . By some means, the attacker may get the session specific random numbers R 1 and R 2 but only knowing R 1 and R 2 will not give any advantage to the attacker as A cannot compute the required session key with R 1 and R 2 . It is observed that, A may also require the long-term secret x s of the cloud server and cloud sensor identity SID n . This shows, it is computationally infeasible for an attacker to compute the session key SK = h(h(ID i R 1 ) h(x s SID n ) R 2 T 2 ). This shows, that our scheme has the potential to resist known session specific random number leakage attack. [38] , [39] We suppose that, attacker A captures the transmitted mes-
10) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE AND REPLAY ATTACKS
and {D i , T 4 } and tries to replay it in order to launch a valid session on behalf of a legal user U i with S n . Due to the applicability of timestamp and dynamic parameters, replaying the transmitted message is invalid as they fail to clear the verification of timestamp threshold. On receiving the messages a verification of the timestamp is done, which restrict the replay attack. This shows, that our scheme has the potential to resist replay attack. Furthermore, as the attacker A does not have the knowledge of the parameter < ID i , α i , b, R 1 > and secret parameters < v, k >, A fails to compute a valid session key. Thus, our scheme has the potential to resist manin-the-middle attack.
VIII. RESULTS: PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH RELATED SCHEMES
This section talks about the performance of our proposed scheme based on the security and functional features, the storage cost utilized by the smartcard and communication cost taken during the transmission of messages. The details are as follows: 
A. COMPARISON OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS/ FUNCTIONAL ATTRIBUTES
As shown in Table 6 , our scheme preserves and resists many of the existing attacks in WSNs. Moreover, in comparison we have also shown that the earlier existing schemes like [9] , [11] , [12] , [17] , [19] , [20] , [26] , and [35] fails to achieve/resist the important security attributes to ensure the security of their proposed schemes. Thus, our scheme proves to be efficient in terms of security and functional attributes.
B. COMMUNICATION COST AND SMART CARD STORAGE COST COMPARIONS AND ANALYSIS
In Table 8 , we have presented the communication cost and the smart card storage of the proposed scheme along with other related schemes [9] , [11] , [12] , [17] , [19] , [20] , [26] , [35] . For computing the smart card storage cost and communication cost, we consider the output of 20 bytes for h(·), if we choose SHA-1 hashing algorithm [36] . And for timestamp, random nonce/random number, identity of user/sensor node we consider 19 bytes. For acknowledgement 20 bytes.
The schemes [9] , [19] , [20] , [26] require less communication cost and [19] , [20] require less smart card storage cost over the proposed scheme. But, we have seen in security features section that these schemes [9] , [19] , [20] , [26] are vulnerable to various security attacks and also do not provide the tabled security attributes. To pay some extra cost for better security features and functionalities is well justified and hence our protocol is better and suitable for real life applications. A graphical representation of communication cost and storage cost is shown in Fig. 11 . 
C. COMPARISON OF COMPUTATION COST
We have followed, the experimental results [37] which were applied using MIRACL C/C++ Library over the system compatible to 32-bit Windows 7 operating systems, Visual C++ 2008 Software.
The experiment results shows that, for symmetric key encryption/decryption AES-128 T E/D ≈ 0.1303 ms, for elliptic curve point multiplication over the finite prime field F p it took T ECC ≈ 7.3529 ms, and for SHA-1 T h ≈ 0.0004 ms, respectively. An illustration of the experimental results are shown in Table 7 .
In comparison to earlier proposed schemes, the proposed scheme consumes much lesser computation cost, such as 0.5219ms as discussed in Table 9 . It is very clear from the comparison our scheme results more efficient than [9] , [11] , [12] , [17] , [26] , and [35] ' s scheme, our scheme preserves and resists the attacks which exists in the network, whereas the other schemes were proven to be vulnerable to achieve security requirements as shown in the Table 4 . A graphical representation of the comparison is given in Fig. 12 . Thus, our scheme proves to be more reliable due to the security and performance.
IX. CONCLUSION
Overall, this paper discusses about newly proposed Jung et al.'s symmetric cryptosystem based authentication and key agreement scheme and analyzes the shortcomings of Jung et al.'s scheme. The vulnerabilities such as Forgery attack, Password guessing attack, Traceability attack, and uninterested in preserving the Privacy of the session key draws out to be the security weaknesses in Jung et al.'s scheme. As a remedial measure we come up with suitable countermeasures applicable to Jung et al.'s scheme and also, we have presented a suitable biometric and symmetric cryptosystem based authentication and key agreement scheme for WSNs, which has the potential to resist the shortcoming in the aforementioned compared schemes as well as has the ability to preserve the other security attributes. Furthermore, our proposed scheme is facilitated with dynamic node addition feature, and an user-friendly password/biometric update facility. In addition, the security of our scheme is shown using the formal analysis procedures like BAN-logic and AVISPA. BAN-logic validates mutual authentication, and AVISPA simulation tool verifies for replay attack and man-in-themiddle attack. Furthermore, the informal security analysis is also presented to show our scheme can satisfy desired security attacks. Finally, the performance of our scheme is compared with the aforementioned schemes. VOLUME 6, 2018 MAJID ALOTAIBI received the Ph.D. degree from The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia. He is currently an Assistant Professor with the Department of Computer Engineering, Umm al-Qura University. His current research interests include mobile computing, mobile and sensor networks, wireless technologies, ad hoc Networks, computer networks (wired/wireless), RFID, and nano electronics. VOLUME 6, 2018 
